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The Challenges of Global Environmental 






Cities—especially those with substantial poor populations—will face increasingly severe 
challenges in tackling the impacts of global environmental change (GEC). As economic 
dynamos and increasingly important population concentrations, cities both contribute 
substantially, and often are very vulnerable, to the impacts of GEC. This applies strongly in 
Africa, one of the world’s poorest regions. The inability of even a relatively wealthy and 
well protected city such as New Orleans in the USA to withstand Hurricane Katrina has 
helped focus attention on the vulnerability of cities that are less protected. Coastal cities and 
towns from Dakar (which is used as a case study) via Lagos, Cape Town, Maputo and 
Mombasa to Djibouti contain many low-lying areas, often accommodating concentrations 
of poor residents, strategic infrastructure and economic production. However, different 
combinations of challenges will affect many inland urban centres. Tackling GEC 
successfully will require more than enhanced disaster preparedness. Action to address 
unsustainable aspects of everyday life and current corporate and institutional activity will be 
necessary. There can be no simple or universal strategy to reduce urban footprints. Local 
conditions (biophysical, structural, socioeconomic and cultural) produce specific constraints 
and opportunities in each context.  
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This paper surveys the phenomenon of global environmental change (GEC) and its 
implications for cities and urban populations in Africa. Today, GEC and the narrower 
concept of climate change are fast becoming buzzwords at all levels of society except, 
perhaps, those for whom its impacts are likely to be most profound, namely the poor. 
This is true in rural and urban areas alike, but the focus here is specifically urban.  
Severe setbacks to household, local or national developmental efforts can take diverse 
forms, perhaps most obviously so-called ‘natural’ or anthropogenic disasters such as 
floods, droughts, famines, hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions or 
polluting accidents at nuclear power stations or petro-chemical complexes. Most of 
these are sudden and of short duration; but longer-term, insidious pollution episodes can 
be as debilitating for those most vulnerable to them (and the local environment) yet 
seldom receive equivalent attention since they are not dramatic, headline-grabbing 
incidents. 
Vulnerability can be understood in different, often cross-cutting, ways. Geographical or 
spatial vulnerability refers to those locations that are most likely to be affected by an 
extreme event, e.g. seashores to tidal waves, river valleys to floods, steep slopes to 
landslides. Social vulnerability refers to those people who are most vulnerable by virtue 
of poverty (low financial and often human capital), low levels of resources (financial 
and physical capital), lack of support networks (social capital), and poor access to the 
corridors of power (political capital). The disaster risk literature has demonstrated that 
poor people generally live in undesirable areas where shelter is cheaper or vacant land 
available for irregular/informal occupancy. It is thus the coincidence of vulnerable 
places and vulnerable people that identifies priorities for preventative, forecasting and 
coping strategies (see, for example, Douglas et al. 2008). This awareness is now 
increasingly being taken up in policy and development agency circles (for example 
Commission for Africa 2005; DFID 2006; Sachs 2005). 
Over the last 15-20 years, a substantial body of evidence and practical experience has 
been built up on ‘natural’ disasters and vulnerability to them, with particular emphasis 
on prediction and subsequent coping and reconstruction strategies. Indeed, the 1990s 
were the United Nations (UN) Decade of Natural Disaster Reduction, a major global 
initiative in this field. For the first time, the 2006/7 edition of State of the World’s Cities 
(UN-HABITAT 2006) included a brief section on the impact of conflicts and natural 
disasters on cities. This is welcome progress, but the narrow focus on the ‘natural’ 
omitted many relevant categories of disaster such as those listed above. Furthermore, a 
clear opportunity to introduce readers to the related concept of GEC was unfortunately 
missed. This was remedied in the 2008/9 edition (UN-HABITAT 2008). 
2 Understanding  GEC 
Most disasters, ‘natural’ or anthropogenic, are one-off events of sudden onset and short 
duration, lasting from a few seconds to a few days. Following rescue operations of 
perhaps a week’s duration, the response shifts to reconstruction—with an emphasis on 
mitigation to reduce vulnerability to future occurrences—and, at least in theory, special 
assistance to the most vulnerable affectees.  
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By contrast, GEC comprises two complementary elements. The first is a process of 
slow-onset changes, such as increasing prevailing atmospheric temperatures, climatic 
humidification or desiccation through changing precipitation patterns, and sea level rise. 
Such trends are being monitored and predicted over a period of decades, providing an 
opportunity to tackle their causes and prepare to reduce their impact through various 
mitigation strategies. However, once they occur, these environmental changes will be 
(semi-)permanent. The second element of GEC comprises the increasing frequency and 
severity of extreme events like hurricanes, tornadoes, droughts and floods. This second 
trend arises because the events are ‘piggy-backing’ on the first, which also provides 
them with a stronger cumulative effect. 
2.1  Distinguishing mitigation from adaptation 
Actions to address GEC fall into two categories. Mitigation comprises efforts to reduce 
the contributions of current activities to GEC, as well as to reducing the impact of, and 
vulnerability to, the various dimensions of GEC. Examples include strengthening 
coastal sea defences, rehabilitating mangroves or reed beds along shorelines and 
riverbanks, increasing the capacity of urban storm water drainage, strengthening and 
protecting vulnerable buildings and infrastructure such as electricity pylons and 
substations, promoting energy efficiency and savings (for example through improved 
insulation of buildings and fitting of low-energy light bulbs), promoting car-sharing and 
use of public transport, or ensuring that resource extraction for urban construction and 
consumption (such as sand and gravel extraction, brick making, fuel wood and reed 
harvesting, groundwater abstraction) do not increase vulnerability. This includes both 
industrial/commercial-scale operations and ‘informal’ activities (themselves now often 
commoditized and commercialized) by the urban poor. They also reduce an urban area’s 
ecological footprint. Such actions are sometimes relatively straightforward, inexpensive, 
quick and short-term. However, they still commonly meet resistance, ranging from 
inertia to scepticism that they will make a significant difference, to opposition on cost 
grounds (because the need may not be immediately evident) and from those with vested 
interests in the status quo (including people whose livelihoods might be perceived to be 
threatened). 
The second category of response is known as adaptation. These responses are generally 
the more difficult, fundamental, long-term and expensive changes required to our 
lifestyles, consumption patterns and behaviour (Adger et al. 2003). In an urban context, 
this would include reducing intra-urban travel through making multipurpose trips and 
using local facilities; addressing urban structure to reduce haphazard suburban and peri-
urban sprawl, promote sustainable densification and multifunctional land use; and 
revising building regulations and standards to use appropriate materials, enhance 
insulation and (in hot climates) reflectivity of roofing, reduce energy consumption and 
enhance resilience to the relevant aspects of GEC (including the risk of flooding or 
chronic water shortages). Many adaptive strategies take more time; require careful 
planning; far larger investments of scarce capital and political will; and are vulnerable 
to the twin challenges of not being immediately and demonstrably necessary and of 
being likely to lose out in the political process to urgent priorities of vocal, powerful or 
politically valuable constituencies. There will also be predictable opposition from those 
who perceive vested interests—either individual or collective—to be challenged by 
changes to norms, investments and practices. However, there are some overlaps 
between the two categories: for instance, a shift to cycling and use of public transport  
3 
can be a mitigation effort but also part of a longer-term adaptive strategy involving 
urban redesign. This underlines the important point that well targeted mitigation and 
adaptation strategies are neither mutually exclusive nor in conflict with each other. 
Publication of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4) (IPCC 2007, 2008a, 2008b) marked something of a watershed 
in climate change science and policy as climate sceptics and deniers have, in effect, now 
lost credibility. Moreover, the IPCC AR4 added to the debate fostered by the Stern 
Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern 2006), which argues that 
there was now compelling evidence that it would be cheaper to tackle climate change 
than to continue avoiding doing so. In other words, climate change was real and 
unavoidable and the longer appropriate mitigation and adaptation were delayed, the 
more costly such actions would become. On the basis of preliminary IPCC data and 
other evidence, the report also indicates the substantial scale of greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions required but points optimistically to these challenges as 
tremendous economic and innovative opportunities. 
2.2  GEC and urbanization 
The dominant foci in GEC research to date have been on global-scale modelling, the 
monitoring and prediction of land use and cover change or water availability in 
implicitly rural contexts, and national policy responses. Yet, as economic dynamos and 
increasingly important population concentrations, cities both contribute substantially to, 
and often are very vulnerable to the impacts of, GEC. This bidirectional relationship 
between urban areas and GEC (Sánchez-Rodríguez et al. 2005) is now the subject of 
increasing research effort, although hitherto concentrated heavily in and on mega- and 
other strategic cities in North America, Western Europe and Japan (for example, 
Bulkeley and Betsill 2003). Disasters and vulnerability thinking (for example, Parker 
and Mitchell 1995; Pelling 2003) remains dominant in urban management as in other 
spheres, but is gradually shifting to include GEC (Leichenko and Solecki 2006). 
The term ‘urban areas’ is used here in order to include intermediate and smaller urban 
areas. The bias of size is already evident in two respects. First, research, perhaps 
inevitably, has been focused almost exclusively on the largest cities, which contribute 
most to GEC and have the largest numbers of people likely to be affected by it. Second, 
whatever the deficiencies (which, in poor countries may be substantial), such cities tend 
to have some in-house professional planning and governance capacity (Wilson 2006).  
Urban areas also form integral parts of wider systems—defined in physiographic, 
politico-administrative and/or functional terms—which traverse peri-urban and rural 
areas within one country and increasingly also across national boundaries. GECs do not 
respect such boundaries and it is therefore important to bear these broader interactions 
and ‘urban footprint’ issues in mind. This may also provide comfort to urban leaders, 
enabling them to attempt to deflect responsibility through blaming external factors and 
processes from beyond their administrative boundaries. Such covert denialism should 
not be acceptable; the transboundary nature of GEC merely underlines the need for 
partnerships among all relevant authorities. 
Towns and cities everywhere contribute to GEC and the impacts of GEC are being, or 
will be, felt globally. Globalization processes also mean that the systems of cities at the 
heart of the world economy are increasingly closely interconnected. Clearly, therefore,  
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there are good reasons to approach GEC research and policymaking from and with a 
global perspective. However, as indicated above, local appropriateness will remain 
important. Particularly in poor and middle-income countries, circumstances are very 
diverse. Generally, though, available resources and relevant standards and strategies 
may be rather different from those formulated in, and relevant to, wealthy countries. 
Importantly, too, the strategic and priority-setting contexts will be different.  
Parnell, Simon and Vogel (2007) see tackling GEC very much as part of broader 
development challenges. Making this connection is vital if GEC is not to be relegated 
by politicians and urban managers to the margins as a longer-term, less certain set of 
future risks and threats than their immediate priority of assuaging basic-needs demands. 
The current resurgence of interest in developmentalism enables and requires 
engagement with debates on the developmental state (central, regional and local). This 
re-engagement with developmentalism represents part of the challenge to neoliberal 
orthodoxies, recognizing that states do need effective capacity and an ability to 
intervene.  
As spatial concentrations of resources, investment and people, including elites, urban 
areas often have greater potential to address the causes and effects of GEC than non-
urban areas. Indeed, some large urban-based national and transnational corporations are 
already taking a lead in adapting their own activities to reduce environmental impacts 
(for example emissions levels, waste production and fossil fuel-derived energy 
utilization) and to move towards a low-carbon economy. Such private sector initiatives 
may also have significant social benefits and should be leveraged to maximize the latter 
element. However, economic and political elites do not always act in the public interest. 
Their interventions in the context of GEC may therefore involve spatially and socially 
selective investments in mitigation that largely ignore, or actually worsen conditions in, 
vulnerable areas inhabited by poorer and marginalized groups. Furthermore, formal 
processes and regulations may everywhere be bypassed through corruption, 
patronage/clientelism or informal relations, the last-mentioned especially in situations 
where non-formal economic activities are prominent. Such factors can be examined by 
means of the analytical perspectives just outlined.  
3  Addressing GEC in African urban areas 
Urban GEC research and planning in poor countries are still in their infancy. This is 
very evident in Africa, one of the world’s poorest regions, with many impoverished 
countries that lack adequate skills and resources to undertake adequate research, to 
formulate appropriate policies or to implement them in order to address the impacts of 
GEC. Indeed, many urban officials and elected representatives remain largely unaware 
of the seriousness of the hazards. They often find the global-level scientific reports and 
debates unintelligible or, as already suggested above, regard supposedly remote threats 
well into the future as representing a very low policy priority relative to the numerous 
immediate demands on their time and scarce resources. Moreover, detailed local data 
and supporting information, which should inform policy and action, are rarely available.  
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3.1  Raising awareness: Initiatives and networks 
Initiatives to address these challenges have recently been launched through a variety of 
organizations, including the UN, other intergovernmental and international non-
governmental bodies and city networks at different geographical scales. The 
International Human Dimensions Programme on GEC’s (IHDP’s) 10-year ‘core project’ 
on Urbanization and GEC (UGEC)1 is distinctive in being dedicated to these issues. It is 
undertaking some research in Africa and is currently establishing a regional network of 
researchers, local authority officials, elected city representatives and agencies in West 
Africa, following a highly successful workshop in Dakar in February 2008 (UGEC 
2008). This, together with an earlier engagement with civil society in Lagos (Simon 
2007), identified some of the needs and current deficiencies in this respect. Similar 
networks exist or are being established in other regions, and it is hoped to extend the 
West African one to eastern and southern Africa or to establish a separate one.  
UN-HABITAT is collaborating with UGEC on the West African network and since 
2007 has been gearing up its own role in respect of cities and climate change. It has 
established its own global network, SUD-NET,2 to promote sustainable urban 
development through Habitat Agenda partners at global and local levels. GEC will form 
one element of its focus. A central element of SUD-NET is the Cities and Climate 
Change Initiative (CCCI), launched in Oslo in March 2009; two African capitals, 
Maputo and Kampala, are among the first four pilot cities (UN-HABITAT 2009). 
The South African Cities Network,3 a well resourced and quite efficient clearing house 
for city managers and officials, fulfils a monitoring, information-exchanging and 
networking role. It has only very recently really begun to engage seriously on climate 
change. Indeed, the State of the Cities Report 2006 (SACN 2006) fails to mention GEC 
or climate change, despite three of the report’s ten concluding challenges addressing 
different aspects of sustainability directly. This reflects the dominant South African 
urban management focus on post-apartheid restructuring and the attendant social, 
economic and environmental justice agendas (McDonald 2002). Johannesburg hosted 
the first substantive countrywide South African local government engagement with 
GEC issues in a national conference on 2-3 June 2008 under the rubric of ‘All hands on 
deck: towards a low carbon economy’.  This event was linked to World Environment 
Day. The hosts emphasized the need for advice on practical policies.4 
Along with Addis Ababa, Cairo and Lagos, Johannesburg is also a member of the C40 
network of the world’s largest cities.5 Originally known as the C18, it initiated biennial 
climate summits in 2005 (London), 2007 (New York) and 2009 (Seoul), bringing 
together mayors, senior officials and business leader to promote the exchange of ideas 
on best practice and collaborative efforts. In 2006, the C40 established a partnership 
with the new Clinton Climate Initiative, dubbed the climate leadership group, in order to 
                                                 
1   www.ugec.org. 
2   www.sudnet.org. 
3   www.sacities.net. 
4   See www.sacities.net/2008/may26_jozisummit.stm. 
5   www.c40cities.org.  
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further its agenda of promoting energy efficiency and reducing carbon emissions more 
effectively.  
At a broader level, the Commonwealth is now also prioritizing climate change, with a 
particular focus on cities. The Commonwealth Consultative Group on Human 
Settlements (CCGHS), an intergovernmental group comprising the national ministers 
responsible for implementing the Habitat Agenda in their own countries, has existed 
since 1998. ComHabitat, established in 2004, is a partnership between CCGHS and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Foundation, Commonwealth Association 
of Planners (CAP), Commonwealth Human Ecology Council, Commonwealth Local 
Government Forum, Homeless International, UN-HABITAT and the British 
government’s Department for International Development (DFID).6 The Commonwealth 
People’s Forum that preceded the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM) in Kampala requested the production by ComHabitat of a State of 
Commonwealth Cities report for the 2009 CHOGM meeting. This document, styled 
after the UN-HABITAT reports referred to above, was prepared under the auspices of 
the CAP, using a set of case studies as the basis for a comprehensive review. Ongoing 
urbanization means that 38 per cent of Commonwealth citizens are now classified as 
urban; in the 32 small-state members, the average is slightly higher, at 39 per cent. Forty 
per cent of cities in the Commonwealth are situated on the coast or in estuaries; many of 
these, especially on small islands or low-lying coastal margins, are particularly 
vulnerable to the effects of GEC.7  
The International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) is the body 
charged with overseeing and promoting Local Agenda 21 formulation and 
implementation by city governments in the wake of the World Conference on 
Environment and Development (the Earth Summit) in 1992 in pursuit of sustainable 
urban development. Under the aegis of its Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) 
Campaign established in 1993, and of which South Africa has the only African 
membership (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004),8 the ICLEI has promoted various actions in 
South African cities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution and waste, such 
as the replacement of conventional street lights with energy-efficient bulbs.  
In the absence of any substantive evaluation of these initiatives and actions, it is 
difficult to assess the efficiency of their implementation or their effectiveness in relation 
to their objectives. My subjective judgement, based on ad hoc observation, 
conversations and examination of documents in several large African cities from Cape 
Town to Lagos and Nairobi to Dakar, is that implementation has been variable. 
Individual actions generally remain just that, rather than being linked and integrated into 
coherent programmes. Moreover, some individual officials and elected representatives 
are reasonably aware and well informed but this has yet to translate into substantive 
widespread awareness or to become embedded within institutional culture and practice. 
Similarly, the Commonwealth’s Development Framework for Human Settlements 
(CCGHS 1999), formulated in 1999 just after the establishment of the CCGHS, does not 
even mention GEC or climate change. This needs updating. However, the Habitat 
Agenda’s concern with Local Agenda 21, which is in essence a mechanism for 
                                                 
6   www.comhabitat.org. 
7   Commonwealth Foundation Briefing Meeting on Cities and Climate Change, London, 23 April 2008. 
8   See also http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=629.  
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mainstreaming implementational capacity to promote sustainable development, does 
represent an appropriate framework for tackling GEC. 
The great majority of all the interventions undertaken to date lie at the ‘easy’ end of the 
spectrum of mitigation actions. For all the reasons outlined above, more costly, complex 
and logistically difficult mitigation actions have not yet been planned, let alone 
attempted. More fundamental adaptive actions remain even further away. Commonly, 
too, golden opportunities are simply missed. For instance, a new breakwater/promenade 
was completed on the southern shore of Victoria Island in Lagos in late 2006 to protect 
government offices, luxury hotels and residences from storm surges. However, its 
design was not bolstered to cater for expected sea level rise or the increased magnitude 
of storm events linked to GEC. 
3.2  The situation on the ground 
The following examples demonstrate that the urban risks from GEC are both far more 
imminent and more substantial than often perceived. They also have fundamental 
implications for all other aspects of urban management, planning and governance. 
Raising awareness and demonstrating the importance of integrating mitigation and 
adaptive strategies into all spheres of existing practice, rather than regarding them as 
separate activities in competition for scarce funds and staff resources, are therefore 
crucial tasks. The inability of even a relatively wealthy and well protected city such as 
New Orleans in the USA to withstand Hurricane Katrina has helped focus attention on 
the vulnerability of cities that are less protected. Imagine for a moment what the effects 
of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami would have been if metropolitan Jakarta, 
Bangkok, Dhaka or Kolkata had been in its path rather than Banda Aceh and numerous 
small coastal towns and villages. Coastal cities and towns from Dakar via Lagos, Cape 
Town, Maputo and Mombasa to Djibouti contain many low-lying areas, often 
accommodating concentrations of poor residents, strategic infrastructure and economic 
production.  However, different combinations of challenges (most conspicuously heat 
islands, desiccation, fresh water supply, diseases and food security) will affect many 
inland urban centres as well. 
Tackling GEC successfully will require more than enhanced disaster preparedness. 
Action to address unsustainable aspects of everyday life and current corporate and 
institutional activity will be necessary. However, the inevitable temptation to search for 
a template or master plan developed elsewhere should be avoided. While much mutual 
learning is clearly possible, especially in terms of identifying the most important 
principles and elements of successful action elsewhere, there can be no simple or 
universal strategy to reduce urban footprints. Local conditions (biophysical, structural, 
socioeconomic and cultural) produce specific constraints and opportunities in each 
context. Even where certain effects, such as urban heat islands, are known to occur 
everywhere, their impact varies according to environmental and climatic conditions, 
urban size, layout, the proportion of urban space devoted to buildings, roads and other 
hard surfaces as opposed to green open space, rivers and other natural features, the 
average height of buildings and construction and roofing materials (Grimmond 2007). It 
is also vital to clarify the important distinctions between (predominantly ‘natural’) 
urban disasters/vulnerability and urban GEC issues.  
The African continent boasts only two of the world’s thirty largest cities, Cairo and 
Lagos. The former was ranked 18th in 1980, 17th in 1990, and 19th in 2000 and was  
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expected to be 16th in 2010. By contrast, Lagos entered this league at 21st in 1980, 
before rising to 6th in 2000 and an anticipated 3rd in 2010 (UNCHS 2001). However, 
the statistical basis of this definition is complex and may not correspond to de facto 
built-up or functional urban areas. For instance, metropolitan Johannesburg fills most of 
Gauteng province, which certainly has an aggregate population qualifying it for 
inclusion in the list of 30 largest cities. A similar situation pertains to Kinshasa.  
Although many of the Commonwealth’s GEC urban hotspots are in South Asia and the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans, Lagos is a key Commonwealth mega-city with great 
vulnerability (see below). Coastal cities from Monrovia in Liberia and Freetown in 
Sierra Leone, Sekondi-Takoradi and Tema in Ghana via Walvis Bay in Namibia to Cape 
Town, Port Elizabeth, Buffalo City, Durban and Richards Bay in South Africa, Maputo 
and Beira in Mozambique, Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and Mombasa, Malindi and 
Lamu in Kenya contain key economic facilities and infrastructure, not to mention often 
substantial vulnerable populations. Mombasa is already subject to regular damaging 
floods from rivers after heavy rains. A sea level rise of 30 cm would inundate some 17 
per cent of the city’s area and affect key functions and livelihoods dependent on tourism 
and agriculture (Awuor, Orindi and Adwera 2008). More generally, there are numerous 
smaller coastal towns and villages, often dependent on artisanal fishing and/or tourism, 
for which the combination of sea level rise, increased storminess and changed inshore 
marine conditions affecting fish harvests represents acute risks. Inland urban areas, 
within both littoral and landlocked Commonwealth African countries, face diverse risks, 
ranging from floods and desiccation, rising temperatures and desertification to threats to 
the security of water, food and fuel wood supplies.  
Kano, Bulawayo,9 Dodoma and Naivasha are prominent examples already at the 
margins of sustainability in terms particularly of water supply; GEC is very likely to 
exacerbate their problems. In Kano’s case, any further modest southward shift in the 
transition zone from the Sahara Desert to well watered intensive agriculture will imperil 
the city’s food security and water supply. Located in the semi-arid zone of south-
western Zimbabwe, Bulawayo has already been beset by chronic water shortages for 
years (Business Report 2007; Gwebu 2002; Musemwa 2006), although this is at least 
partly due to political factors that have delayed investment in new supplies. Dodoma, 
Tanzania’s new capital city, is also situated on a semi-arid escarpment and if the city 
grows as intended once the all-but-stalled government relocation is complete, it will 
face similar problems. Naivasha’s location on the southern shore of Lake Naivasha, one 
of the few Rift Valley lakes with potable water, has been fundamental to the rise of its 
intensive horticulture industry since the promotion of high-value, non-traditional 
exports under neoliberal economic diversification policies. The lake’s water level has 
fallen to critical levels, while the water table in the surrounding farmland is also 
dropping. Various conservation measures have yet to have a significant impact or prove 
enforceable. 
Much of the Gulf of Guinea coastline is alluvial in nature and low-lying, with coastal 
dunes and other formations that are vulnerable to erosion. This has already been 
problematic for some considerable time as a result of storms and human activity, which 
has already affected local weather conditions. Several coastal capital cities, such as 
                                                 
9   President Mugabe withdrew Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth in 2003, but the new government is 
likely to seek readmission soon.  
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Lagos, Cotonou and Accra, are situated in natural harbours afforded by lagoons, 
estuaries or artificial links to coastal lakes. Significant parts of the lagoon shores and 
hinterlands actually lie at or below mean sea level. These coastal environments now 
suffer heavy pollution from industry, sewage and indiscriminate refuse dumping. The 
destruction of mangrove swamps, which are among the most efficient breakwaters and 
silt traps, as well as vital breeding grounds for diverse fish and arthropod species, has 
contributed to the problem in such areas, as well as affecting the livelihoods of artisanal 
fisher folk adversely. Lagos has suffered as much as anywhere in this respect (Simon 
2007). 
3.3  Case study: Dakar 
Dakar’s location on a peninsula jutting into the Atlantic, coupled with variations in 
elevation and a rapidly growing metropolitan population of over three million (equating 
to half the country’s urban population and over a quarter of the national population), 
creates multiple vulnerabilities. Many of the new domestic migrants hail from the 
interior, where rainfall variability, exacerbated by climate change, has reduced farming 
livelihood opportunities. However, there are also extensive international migration and 
circulation patterns centred on the city, and much of the new peripheral urban 
development is financed by remittances and investment in profitable real estate by 
expatriate Senegalese (Guèye, Fall and Tall 2007). Dakar is a strongly primate city, 
containing a disproportionate share of national economic activity and gross 
geographical product. In terms of GEC coping strategies, the absence of an overarching 
metropolitan planning agency to link the 53 separate local authorities is a major 
impediment (République du Senegal et al. 2007). 
Data for Cotonou (Benin) provide a reasonable estimate of the likely magnitudes of sea 
level rise in the region: the average and extreme scenarios suggest 20 and 39  cm, 
respectively, by 2050 and 49 and 59  cm, respectively, by 2100 (Dossou and 
Glenhouenou-Dossou 2007); in the light of the most recent scientific estimates of 
accelerated polar ice cap melting, the extreme figures are more likely to be accurate than 
when these data were produced. Many of the poorest and most vulnerable people 
occupy areas most at risk from flooding and sea level rise. This is immediately evident 
from the comparison of the satellite photo of Dakar’s built-up area (Figure 1) and the 
map showing the areas prone to inundation and to periodic storm flooding (in blue-grey 
and pale blue respectively) (Figure 2). Indeed, the mayor of Rufisque (see Figure 2) 
described vividly at the UGEC/UN-HABITAT workshop in February 2008 how the sea 
had encroached progressively to the point where it was now literally within a few 
metres of the nearest homes. Along the coast to the north, irregular settlement just 
beyond the beach is creating major environmental and sanitation problems, contributing 
to health hazards and the risk of flooding during severe storms as in 2005 or the rainy 
season. Some retrofitting of service infrastructure has occurred in these areas, 
conveying de facto legitimacy on the residents, but the rate of growth is far outstripping 
the city’s planning and implementational capacity. Extensive illegal sand extraction on 
the beach for urban construction is increasing vulnerability to storm surges and coastal 
inundation. Despite its coastal location, Dakar lies in a semi-arid zone, where water 
supply and provisioning represent major challenges to the growing city. Guèye, Fall and 
Tall (2007: 90-92) also attribute one dimension of internal migration, and the large-
scale departures of migrants in unseaworthy vessels heading for the Canary Islands and 
ultimately a better life in Europe, to the impact of industrial overfishing and changing  
10 
marine conditions as a result of climate change, which have greatly reduced the 
availability of fish stocks to these coastal artisanal fishing communities. 
 
Figure 1 
Google Earth image of the built-up area of metropolitan Dakar  
Source: © Google Earth 
Figure 2:  
Google Map showing area of metropolitan Dakar that would be flooded  
(pale blue) by a sea level rise of 1 m  
Source: © Google Earth 
Conclusions 
This paper has surveyed the challenges of coping with GEC in urban Africa. Various 
international, regional and national agencies and city networks engage with GEC to 
differing extents, some of them just now beginning to incorporate it into their activities.  
11 
Up to now, ‘sustainable development’ in various guises has been the nearest point of 
contact, but this has tended to remain principally concerned with the Habitat Agenda 
and implementation of Local Agenda 21s. The more detailed examination of existing 
conditions and vulnerabilities to GEC impacts in urban areas across Africa 
demonstrated the potential scale of the problems. Some of these are already 
demonstrably being experienced, often with unintended consequences, but others are 
still some way off. 
One of the key challenges is therefore ensuring appropriate levels of awareness by 
African urban planners and managers of the urgency of GEC threats, and then 
converting this awareness into appropriate actions in situations where distant and less 
certain impacts pale into insignificance in relation to immediate basic needs and other 
demands on the public exchequer. Delays will prove costly, even though African cities 
still contribute little to global emissions, because of the cumulative impacts and often 
substantial investment lags. Such actions as have been undertaken in a few cities to date 
aim straightforwardly at mitigation, while there is little evidence of adaptive planning or 
implementation. 
Analysis of the urban impacts and governance implications of GEC means addressing 
resource availability (water and sanitation services; electricity; woody biomass for low-
income residents unable to use electricity; sand, gravel and other construction 
materials), resource consumption (incentives and re-/constraints on land, water and 
energy use) and the impacts of resource use choice (atmospheric pollution; watercourse 
and groundwater contamination or salinization through rising seawater penetration of 
coastal water tables; land degradation and loss of vegetative ground cover), and also 
urban preparedness, anticipatory planning, regulation and state and civil society hazard 
response capability. Research is required in different contexts to expose how these 
initiatives can be targeted variously at rich and poor people and the neighbourhoods 
which they inhabit. Evidence-led planning and management for GEC mitigation and 
adaptation may be a remote possibility at present in most African urban areas, but it will 
become increasingly important. GEC thinking ultimately needs to be embedded within 
all forms of research, planning and action. This requires a strategic, medium- to long-
term perspective that avoids seeing GEC mitigation and adaptation as conflicting with 
other interventions aimed at promoting social equity, environmental justice or urban 
sustainability. Put bluntly, without viable GEC strategies, the other interventions risk 
being eclipsed by a rising tide of change.  
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